This chapter analyses the Norwegian authorities' presence on Twitter during the 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks. Twitter activity by two official institutions is analysed in particular, namely, the blood bank at Oslo University Hospital and the Norwegian Police Security Services (PST). Our findings show that the Norwegian authorities were almost completely absent on Twitter during the critical hours of the terrorist attack, and that there was no coordination and synchronisation of communication from the authorities. This official silence allowed the diffusion of speculation and misinformation to take place; these were neither corrected nor addressed, as the analysed PST case shows. In contrast, the blood bank used Twitter to r Rune Ottosen and Steen Steensen. Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode 63 mobilise blood donors to address an acute problem: a shortage of blood to treat casualties. The chapter concludes by offering recommendations to the authorities for future major incidents.
INTRODUCTION
During the terrorist attacks in Oslo and at Utøya on 22 July 2011, in which 77 people were killed, the head of communication at the Norwegian Police Security Services (PST) was monitoring Twitter communication related to the attacks. He found much relevant information circulating on the micro-blogging service. In an interview with the head of communications at The Norwegian PST, we were surprised by a statement regarding 22 July 2011. He stated that he followed Twitter and was thinking that he hoped that Buskerud police district was watching this since they had the operative responsibility. As a contrast to this way of engaging with social media content during the terrorist incident, soon after the attack on the government building in the centre of Oslo, the head of the blood bank at Oslo University Hospital used Twitter to urge citizens to give blood to help out in the treatment of casualties. The response was overwhelming, and the blood bank continued to use Twitter throughout the evening to coordinate blood donations.
These two ways of using Twitter during the terrorist attack represent two different social media strategies employed by authorities during the crisis: the silent bystander (PST), and the active participant (the blood bank). In this chapter, we will take a closer look at the Norwegian author- 
SITUATION AWARENESS, SOCIAL MEDIA AND CRISIS COMMUNICATION
Technology in general and social media in particular are increasingly seen as important factors in dealing with crises in a modern society (Bruns & Burgess, 2014; International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2013; Kaufmann, 2015) . Historically, the Internet is a relatively recent phenomenon in media management of crisis, but today it is unthinkable to develop media strategies to cope with disasters without implementing what is often referred to as Web 2.0 technologies (Kaufmann, 2015) . In 2011, the OECD report Future Global Shocks tried to identify new communication technologies that could be useful during disasters and concluded that social media 'have the potential to prevent communication breakdown through reliance on just one platform and thereby to reinforce the diffusion of warning messages but also present policy makers with new challenges' (Wendling, Radisch, & Jacobzone, 2013, p. 6) .
One obstacle to implementing social media in the media management of crises is that many communicators have reservations about the credibility of social media content (Wright & Hinson, 2009) . However, findings from recent research seem to indicate that there is a growing feeling in most organisations that decision makers 'no longer have a choice about whether to integrate social media into crisis management; the only choice is how to do so' (Jin, Liu, & Austin, 2014, p. 76) .
Social media can play a vital role in the creation of 'situation awareness' (SA) during a crisis. Endsley (1995, p. 36) defines situation awareness as 'the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future'. SA is, in other words, being aware of what is going on at a given time and in a given space, how to understand it, and how to act on that knowledge immediately and properly. Creating SA is Blood and Security During the Norway Attacks vital during an emergency for all parties À the authorities, the police, rescue workers, those affected and the public À to get control of the situation and minimise harm.
In recent years much attention has been given to how SA is not only an individual process, but something which is created in collaboration (Salmon et al., 2008) . For the authorities, it is becoming established knowledge that the public can serve as a resource in risk and crisis management and that 'crisis communication best practices would emphasize a dialogic approach' (Seeger, 2006, p. 238) . Social media are potentially an 'awareness system' (Maireder & Ausserhofer, 2014) and tools for making sense of an emergency event (Heverin & Zach, 2012) . They thereby represent arenas for collaboratively created SA À arenas authorities can take advantage of in order: (1) to monitor how a crisis situation like a terrorist attack is understood and acted upon; (2) to spread information, correct misinformation and interact with the public in order to secure that a best possible SA is created for the general public and (3) to get information in order to secure a best possible SA for themselves.
However, how such collaborative SA is 'configured' via dialogue and distributed through social media during an emergency is not properly addressed by research, according to Perng et al. (2012) . Recent research has shown how various authorities have managed to take advantage of social media to configure SA during crisis situations. During the flood in Queensland, Australia in 2011, the Queensland Police played a leading role on Twitter in 'disseminating timely and relevant information to the public, and in coordinating and guiding the wider discussion' (Bruns, Burgess, Crawford, & Shaw, 2012, p. 8) . The authorities in Kenya used
Twitter actively during the Westgate mall terrorist attack in 2013 to communicate with the public and among themselves (Simon, Goldberg, Aharonson-Daniel, Leykin, & Adini, 2014) .
There are, however, several challenges for authorities using social media to configure SA during an emergency. One challenge is related to coordination and synchronisation of information. During the Westgate mall attack in Kenya, Simon et al. (2014, p. 9) Previous research has shown that social media played a vital role during and in the aftermath of the attack. Social media were pivotal in the 'meet-hate-with-love' discourse that dominated the Norwegian public sphere in the aftermath of the attack (Kverndokk, 2013) , and such media represented arenas for 'backchannel discourse negotiations' (Eriksson, 2016 , p. 1) especially related to differing understandings of the event.
Activity in the Norwegian Twitter-sphere doubled during the crisis situation (see Chapter 1 for a thorough analysis of dominant actors and themes in the Norwegian Twitter-sphere). Kaufmann (2015, p. 14) found that social media during 22 July created new forms of "selfinitiated and mediated resilience governance," which emerged spontaneously and have since been implemented in programmes for emergency management. Social media also made it possible for the individuals at Utøya to 'watch out' for each other and created a sense of sharing and caring (Kaufmann, 2015, pp. 14À15). In contrast to the critique of the police, the commission reports favourably on the way the health authorities in general, and especially Oslo University Hospital, dealt with the challenges, even though the report does not go into specific details on the use of social media by these authorities.
METHODOLOGY
To answer the research question, the chapter is based on a triangulation of methods involving: (1) We then constructed a database containing all 2.2 million tweets, and for the purpose of this chapter, we extracted all tweets (58,538) posted between 15.25 (the time of the bomb blast) and 21.00 (when the terrorist had been apprehended and the situation was under control) on 22 July from the database. All user-IDs, retweets and mentions in this set of tweets were then manually analysed to identify activity by any kind of authority or public body. The purpose here was not only to find out which
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Twitter.
Furthermore, all the 58,538 tweets were read manually to get a sense of dominant themes and communicators. Based on this manual reading and the authorities identified, the communication from the Norwegian Security Police (PST) and Oslo University Hospital was selected for further analysis, because of these authorities' different approaches to Twitter as a communicative tool during the crises. These two case studies extend beyond the critical hours to also include tweets posted past 21.00 on 22 July.
Lastly, we conducted a semi-structured in-depth interview with the head of communication at PST. 2 The research group in the RESCUE project has conducted several additional interviews with representatives of other authorities on social media strategies related to emergencies, and the findings from these interviews, which are presented in Hornmoen Backholm, Frey, Ottosen, Reimerth, and Steensen (2018) , will also be drawn upon in this chapter.
FINDINGS
In the following, we will present the findings of the empirical investigation.
First, we will present the general picture of how Norwegian authorities were represented on Twitter during the critical hours on 22 July 2011.
Then we will present the social media strategy of the two cases further analysed; PST and Oslo University Hospital. Finally, we will present the analysis of the activities of these two authorities on Twitter during and in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.
Norwegian Authorities on Twitter 22 July Of the 8,290 Norwegian Twitter accounts found in our material that posted at least one tweet, only the nine shown in Table 1 represent governmental or public bodies. These nine accounts posted in total 22 tweets À 0.004 per cent of the 58,538 tweets posted in our material during the same hours. In other words: Norwegian authorities, such as the police (apart from the one PST tweet), fire departments, ministries, etc., did not use Twitter to communicate with the public about the crisis situation. If we look at the number of retweets from other accounts for the 22 tweets in Table 1 , we see that at least some of the nine Twitter accounts had a significant outreach. The 22 tweets were retweeted 430 times in total, with @Oslounivsykehus and the prime minister @jensstolteberg attracting most of this attention. This might indicate a public need to get information from authorities during the emergency, an indication that is further strengthenend if we look at the authorities mentioned by
Norwegian Twitter users during the same time period ( Table 2 ). Table 2 , the Norwegian prime minister Jens Stoltenberg had by far the most mentioned Twitter account belonging to a Norwegian authority, followed by the mayor of Oslo's official account. The 10 accounts in Table 2 were mentioned in total 360 times (excluding mentions that occur as part of a retweet), which À compared to the number of tweets they posted À is a strong indication of people wanting these authorities to be active on Twitter and address the terror attacks.
As shown in
However, only four of the 10 accounts in Table 2 posted something during the same hours.
Interestingly, three of the 10 mentioned accounts in Table 2 are personal accounts, in the sense that they belong to the persons holding the office rather than the office itself (@jensstoltenberg, @fabianstang, @jonasgahrstore).
Of special interest in Table 2 are (1) The cornerstone in the media strategy at PST is to build a trusting relationship with the public. In order to have efficient communication, PST needs to communicate with the public based on mutual trust.
(2) The most important aspect of the communicative strategy is optimal precision in the content of the communication, and precision in how to target the audience, the press and other government institutions. as an alternative, but chose Facebook as their first priority.
(4) PST does not use Twitter and Facebook to communicate to the public on a regular basis, but as channels to announce vacant positions, etc.
(5) PST monitors Twitter and Facebook on a daily basis to identify potential threats to national security.
(6) After 22 July, Twitter has become the main channel for communication with the media. Twitter has replaced press conferences as a way to communicate with journalists. Twitter messages with links to written statements are spread simultaneously to all the major media when something important is to be announced. PST has been criticised for stopping the practice of sending out press releases. PST also uses blogs on their home page to communicate with the public.
PST followed Twitter and Facebook on 22 July. As mentioned in our introduction, the head of communication made the following reflection: 'I hope Nordre Buskerud police district is following this, since they have the operative responsibility (at Utøya)'. In addition to monitoring Twitter, the head of communication was following the online newspaper VG Nett and heard the blast from his office.
Oslo police district had the operative responsibility for the operation in Oslo (i.e. they 'owned' the operation). PST used social media at the time mainly to keep themselves updated. A major challenge in the future, according to the head of communication at PST, is to reach a younger audience. PST therefore considers using Snapchat and the youth channel NRK Supernytt more actively.
The blood bank, with help of the communication unit at Oslo University hospital, wanted to control the information strategy themselves and decided to use Twitter and Facebook to communicate their needs and interact with potential blood donors. However, in their first tweet, they 73 Blood and Security During the Norway Attacks forgot to mention that they only wanted a response from registered blood donors.
According to interviews with staffers at Oslo University Hospital conducted by Måseide (2013) , the situation could have gone out of control, both in terms of lack of security and because of the communication overload. The problem was a lack of direct messages to those blood donors the hospital really needed to reach. Other hospitals were also approached by potential blood donors, and one of the lessons learned was that if the administration for the whole health region (Vestre Viken) had been on Twitter, collectively they could have coordinated the campaign more efficiently. When the hospitals handling of the events was evaluated, it was also underlined that Oslo University Hospital should have made clear that no other hospital was to be contacted by blood donors (Måseide, 2013) .
The Passive Observer: PST
As we heard from the statement of head of communication at PST, the passive attitude towards social media was explained by the fact that Buskerud Police District 'owned' the operation on Utøya. The 22 July Commission, on the other hand, suggested that PST could have benefitted from a more active role on social media (NOU, 2012) .
Of all the 58,538 tweets published between 15.25 and 21.00 on 22
July in our material, the PST Twitter account (@PSTnorge) was mentioned 46 times, 29 of which were mentions in connection with retweets of the one tweet PST posted during the critical hours. In addition, 43 tweets addressed or mentioned PST without mentioning the account name during the time period, 53 if we extend the period to midnight.
The one tweet that @PSTnorge posted, read: 'Powerful explosion in Oslo. PST has at this time no information on the background to the explosion'.
3 The first tweet in the dataset that mentioned PST was posted by an individual member of the public, who at 15.56 wrote: 'PST asks people to stay away from Oslo city centre'. There is no source mentioned for this statement and since the source of origin is a private person and not PST, one cannot be sure whether the message is genuine.
The next relevant tweet was the following remark from an anonymous account: 'I wonder how the summer replacements responsible for We also find that PST is addressed directly: 'PST: Sharper attention!!!!' (16.57). In another direct mention: 'Why have you not advised the military to close the borders, stop all transport apart from officials, etc.' There was also speculation revealing that the public had expectations of PST: 'My guess is a gas tank or something like that. If not, PST has done a lousy job' (16.37).
To summarise the first hour after the blast: since PST had just one tweet directed at the public, we see that some tweeters refered to PST with what they thought PST was saying and doing. We can also sense frustration, since PST was addressed directly with an urge to 'do something'.
During the first period after the attack there was much speculation both in the traditional media and in social media about whether radical Muslims were responsible for the acts of terror (Ottosen & Bull, 2016) . Another person was impatient with the lack of response from PST: 'An update from PST-Janne would be in order' (23.32; referring to the head of PST, Janne Kristiansen). But there were also those who praised PST: 'PST receives information from the audience, people are getting organised, hospitals being protected, the terrorist is caught, well done' (23.04). PST is also asked to look at Internet sites with hate speech: 'PST look at this' (with a link attached; 00.10).
When it became known that the perpetrator was a white Norwegian, more serious criticism of PST's lack of interest in right-wing extremists was raised: 'According to PST right-wing extremism represents no threat to Norway in 2011' (00.15). A link to PST's annual report was attached.
This tweet was the most retweeted (around 20 times). The criticism got sharper after midnight. One tweeter suggested that: 'If PST has made a mistake, several people should be fired' (00.11).
To summarise, we note that the vast majority of tweets about PST were critical comments and part of discussions related to PST's (lack of) performance. Obviously, the police security service did not use Twitter to communicate with the public. This was also confirmed in the interview with the head of communication at PST.
The Active Participant: Oslo University Hospital
The official account of Oslo University Hospital, @oslounivhospital, was mentioned in total 218 times from 15.25 to 21.00 on 22 July in our material; 185 of those mentions being in retweets of tweets from @oslou- Obviously, all these messages created a lot of traffic and chaos, and several tweeters expressed concerns during the evening. One user tweeted directly from the blood bank: 'I am at the blood bank now, the blood bank is full, no point in going there now. Everyone can come 9 a.m. tomorrow. See you there ' (22.15) . At 22.18, Oslo University Hospital tweeted that they had enough blood: 'The blood bank reports that a lot of people have been giving blood, they now have what they need. We would like to thank everybody who has turned up' (22.18) .
To summarise the Twitter communication on the blood bank and Oslo University Hospital, we see that it was dominated by direct calls from the hospital to the public with an appeal to give blood. The response was immediately picked up, and in less than 3 hours the mission was completed, and the blood bank urged the public to stop coming. The public response had been so massive that it was difficult for the hospital to deal with.
DISCUSSION
The blood bank case serves as an example of what Ling and Yttri (2002) label 'micro-coordination' of an emergency response, in which social media helped to obtain situation awareness (SA) related to the potential sub-crisis of acquiring enough blood to save casualties. In line with the findings of Perng et al. (2012) , our analysis demonstrates how SA was acquired through collaboration between the hospital and the public. The hospital expressed their need for blood and urged the public to give blood, and the public helped with spreading the information on Twitter and giving instructions and clarifications as the situation changed. Members of the public acted as 'remote operators' in awareness configuration (Heath, Svensson, Hindmarsh, Luff, & Lehn, 2002) and through this collaboration, the University Hospital and the public quickly and efficiently managed to establish a common 78
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understanding of what the potential sub-crisis of blood shortage was, and how to act upon it. Within a few hours, the potential sub-crisis had therefore been resolved. However, the lack of precision in the first tweet on registered blood donors almost caused the situation to get out of control.
The blood bank case is a rare exception to how the authorities used social media during the 22 July crisis. Neither the police nor other emergency institutions used Twitter to communicate with the public on what was going on, and the PST case shows how such an absence of activity could lead to speculation and misinformation about, for instance, how many attacks were going on and who the perpetrator was. Such speculation, when not corrected or in other ways addressed by the PST, obstructed the creation of a proper SA and probably caused more confusion and fear about the crisis than necessary among the public.
The number of retweets and mentions about the authorities during the crisis found in our material suggests that the public's need to get in contact with À and get information from À authorities by far exceeded the authorities' activity on Twitter. However, absence of activity was not the only problem with how the Norwegian authorities used social media during the 22 July crisis. As Table 1 suggests, the authorities that actually did post something during the critical hours are not representative of those one would expect to take the lead in official communication about the event. There was not a single, official institution that took on the role as coordinator of crisis communication in social media during the critical hours, and therefore people were unlikely to know who to turn to. This might be an explanation as to why so many tweeters turned to the personal accounts of the prime minister of Norway (@jensstolten-berg) and the mayor of Oslo (@fabianstang) instead of the official accounts of the authorities, as shown in Table 2 . This need to get in contact with individuals instead of institutions echoes Seeger's (2006) finding that the best practice in official crisis communication implies honesty, candour and openness, and that the public respond more positively to spokespersons who are compassionate, concerned and empathetic, because these are subjective traits associated with individuals, not institutions. This official silence gave space for the diffusion of speculation and misinformation, which were not corrected or addressed, as the analysed PST case shows. This clearly demonstrates the danger highlighted by the OECD about the effects of leaving social media out of crisis communication preparedness (Wendling et al., 2013) . It seems safe to assume that the official silence related to social media crisis communication during the critical hours of the attacks obstructed an efficient configuration of situation awareness, both for the public and for the authorities, especially when we consider the degree to which Twitter was used as a channel of communication in Norway during the attack, with almost 60,000 Norwegian tweets posted during the critical hours.
The blood bank case illustrates the potential of social media in a crisis situation like a terrorist attack with a high number of casualties. Oslo University Hospital had a potential sub-crisis of their own related to not having enough blood to help save the injured, and they dealt with this sub-crisis by configuring situation awareness in collaboration with the public on Twitter. Based on this case, the other findings of this study and previous research, we conclude by offering the following advice to authorities on how to use social media to configure situation awareness during an acute and unforeseen crisis:
• Social media are important arenas for configuring situation awareness during a crisis, and authorities need to coordinate and synchronise their crisis communication in social media. However, messages distributed on social media should be well constructed so as to avoid
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• Members of the public can become remote operators in configuring situation awareness during a crisis, and authorities need to acknowledge that situation awareness is best and most efficiently configured not as directives but as a result of collaboration with the public.
• Previously established relations are important to define who the public will choose to turn to and follow during a crisis, and relations with individuals are stronger than institutional relations. The authorities, therefore, need to establish good, personal relations with the public based on compassion, empathy and openness in their everyday communication, so that the public knows who to turn to in times of crisis, and know that they will be listened to and met with understanding and honesty. 3. All tweets quoted are translated from Norwegian by the authors.
